Mortgages denominated in domestic and foreign currencies : simple models by Király, J. & Simonovits, András
    
 
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK                           DISCUSSION PAPERS  
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES,  
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES BUDAPEST, 2015 
 
MT-DP – 2015/13 
 
 
 
Mortgages denominated in domestic and 
foreign currencies: simple models 
 
JÚLIA KIRÁLY – ANDRÁS SIMONOVITS 
 2 
 
Discussion papers 
MT-DP – 2015/13 
 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque comments.  
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. 
Mortgages denominated in domestic and foreign currencies: simple models 
Authors: 
Júlia Király 
Head of Department 
 Teaching and Research Centre 
Department of Economics and Finance 
International Business School, Budapest  
e-mail: jkiraly@ibs-b.hu  
 
 
András Simonovits  
research advisor 
Institute of Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
also Mathematical Institute of Budapest University of Technology 
and Department of Economics of CEU 
e-mail: simonovits. andras@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2015 
 
 
ISBN 978-615-5447-72-3 
ISSN 1785 377X 
 3 
 
Mortgages denominated in domestic  
and foreign currencies: simple models 
 
 
Júlia Király – András Simonovits 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
After the short temporary popularity of FX denominated loans, during the Great Financial 
and Economic Recession (2007–2013), the burden of these loans has become unaffordable 
for a lot of borrowers. We have designed a family of simple models to compare the cash flows 
of installments and the paths of outstanding debts denominated in domestic and foreign 
currencies, respectively. Having these models, we are able to draw several conclusions 
relevant to the recent debates about the foreign currency denominated loans. Our study 
demonstrates the key role played by the uncovered interest rate parity in comparisons. 
Moreover, we give a closed-form solution for the trade-off between the depreciation and the 
unilateral interest rate increases by the banks. In a simple model, we determine the optimal 
size for domestic and foreign currency denominated loans, respectively. 
 
 
 
Keywords: mortgage, currency denominated loan, credit crisis, payback models with 
annuity 
 
 
JEL classification: C63, D14, G21 
 
 
 4 
 
 
Jelzáloghitel-törlesztés forintban és devizában:  
egyszerű modellek 
 
Király Júlia – Simonovits András 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A devizaalapú jelzáloghitelek néhány éves népszerűség után, a nemzetközi válság kitörését 
követően jelentős, nem egyszer elviselhetetlen terhet jelentettek a hitelfelvevőknek. Olyan 
minimális modellcsaládot állítunk fel, amely alkalmas a forint- és a devizaalapú 
jelzáloghitelek törlesztési- és adósságpályáinak összehasonlítására és számos – a mai 
devizaalapú hitelek körüli viták szempontjából – fontos tanulság levonására. Tanulmányunk 
megmutatja, hogy miért referencia a fedezetlen kamatparitásnak megfelelő leértékelődés 
melletti adósságpálya. Zárt képletben adjuk meg, hogy a devizaadós számára mi az átváltás az 
árfolyamromlás és az egyoldalú banki kamatemelés okozta hatás között. Egy egyszerű modell 
keretében kitérünk a forint-, illetve devizaalapú hitel optimális nagyságának 
meghatározására. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: jelzáloghitelezés, devizaalapú hitelek, hitelválság, annuitásos törlesztő 
modellek 
 
 
JEL kód: C63, D14, G21 
Mortgages denominated in domestic and
foreign currencies: Simple models
Ju´lia Kira´ly and Andra´s Simonovits
February 11, 2015
1) International Business School,
Budapest, Za´hony u 7, Hungary, 1031
e-mail: jkiraly@ibs-b.hu.
and
2) Institute of Economics, CERS, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
also Mathematical Institute of Budapest University of Technology,
and Department of Economics of CEU
Budapest, Budao¨rsi u´t 45, Hungary, 1112
e-mail: simonovits.andras@krtk.mta.hu,
Abstract
After the short temporary popularity of foreign currency denominated
(FXD) loans, during the Great Financial and Economic Recession (2007–
2013), the burden of these loans has become unaffordable for a lot of bor-
rowers in East Central Europe. We have designed a family of simple models
to compare the cash flows of installments and the paths of outstanding debts
denominated in domestic and foreign currencies, respectively. Having these
models, we are able to draw several conclusions relevant to the recent de-
bates about the FXD loans. Our study demonstrates the key role played
by the uncovered interest rate parity in the comparisons. Moreover, we give
a closed-form solution for the trade-off between the depreciation and the
unilateral FX interest rate increases by the banks. Adding a lifetime utility
function to our simple model, we determine the optimal size for domestic
and foreign currency denominated loans, respectively.
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1. Introduction
In the 2000s, loans denominated in foreign currencies (for short, FXD loans) have
spread in a number of East- and Central European countries, namely in the Baltic
Republics, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania (Figure 1 and see e.g. Zettelmeyer et
al. (2010) and Kira´ly and Banai (2014)). In most of these countries, inflation rates
had been high and volatile, exchange rates had been stable or even appreciating,
the low Euro and the even lower Swiss franc interest rates and the expected close
date of joining the Euro have made the FXD loans attractive (Brown and de Haas
(2012), Fidrmuc et al. (2013)). All these circumstances contributed to the fact that
by 2008 in most of these countries, the FXD loans had summed up to 50–80% of
the total household loans.
Figure 1: The share of FDX loans in several ECE countries. Source: the webpage
of the National Banks of the foregoing countries.
The international financial crises started in 2007, which quickly widened into
an economic crisis. At the Fall of 2008, the waves generated by default of the
Lehman Brothers also reached the over indebted ECE countries and as a result, their
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currencies substantially weakened. For example, the Hungarian forint depreciated by
25% with respect to the Swiss franc (FX), and after weak appreciation, at the crisis
of the euro-zone in 2011 also depreciated another 25%.1 In the Baltic Republics,
which were most indebted in FX, due to the cautiously preserved currency board,
the exchange rates remained fixed and the exceptionally strict austerity was achieved
through internal devaluation: the nominal values of public sector wages and pensions
were significantly reduced.2 In other related countries (e.g. Poland), the unfavorable
impact of currency depreciation was significantly counterbalanced by the drop in the
foreign interest rate, either Euro or Swiss franc (Kira´ly and Banai, 2014).
In Hungary, however,—almost uniquely in Europe—the interest rates in the retail
market were not fixed or floating rates, but so-called variable rates, which could
be discretionally modified by the lenders. Due to the significantly rising CDS of
Hungary, the additional cost of worsening portfolios and the rising fiscal burdens,
the banks in Hungary did not follow the diminishing FX interest rates, rather they
increased them several times (Pitz and Schepp (2013), Kira´ly and Banai (2014)).
Due to steeply rising nominal installments and stagnating net nominal wages, the
share of defaulting borrowers significantly increased.
The present paper skips the details of these painful processes, rather it studies
deterministic models of long-term mortgages, denominated either in domestic or
foreign currency. We work out the equations of the repayment process; furthermore,
analyze and display the repayment and debt paths on stylized data. Our starting
point is the real cost of inflation, already discussed in the period of high inflation
of the 1970s by Modigliani and Lessand (1975) and Fischer and Modigliani (1978)
and applied to the analysis of a previous crisis of the Hungarian mortgage market
by Simonovits (1992).
For expositional reasons, we shall illustrate our findings numerically. The initial
debt is 10 K units, the repayment time is T = 20 years. The total interest rate at
home is 12%, while abroad is 6 %. Deviating from the banks’ practice, we calculate
in years rather than months, but the difference is so small that it is negligible.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the
local currency (LC) loans based on annuity, emphasizing the impact of inflation with
fixed real interest rate and perfect indexation (Fisher, 1930). Section 3 studies the
FXD loans, with special emphasis on the uncovered interest parity, the depreciation
shock and the change in the FX interest rate. We analyze LC and FXD loans’ debt
and repayment paths at nominal and real values. We also compare the financial
position of the LC and the FXD borrowers. Section 4 models the optimal choice of
the loan size in the two cases. Section 5 draws the conclusions.
1In extreme cases, the shocks were even stronger but we confine our attention to the average.
2Experts excluded such a solution earlier because lower incomes make the continuation of
loans difficult.
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2. Domestic annuity loans with inflation
To better understand the problem of FXD loans, we start our analysis with domestic
annuity loans with inflation. Let D0 be the initial value of the loan, T the maturity
(payback time), and let t = 1, 2, . . . , T the index of repayment period (month, here
year). Let Bt be the installment paid at the end of period t, and let Rt be the per-
period interest factor (=1+interest rate) and Dt be the end-of-period debt. Then
the following equation holds by definition:
Dt = RtDt−1 −Bt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1, T, D0 given. (1)
We shall need the compounded interest factor between the start of period 1 and the
end of period t:
Rt = R1 · · ·Rt−1Rt. (2)
Using the concept of present value, the debt dynamics can be given by a closed
formula as a function of the initial debt and the previous repayments:
R−1t Dt = D0 −R−11 B1 −R−12 B2 − · · · −R−1t−1Bt−1 −R−1t Bt. (3)
With rearrangement,
Dt = RtD0 −RtR−11 B1 −RtR−12 B2 − · · · −RtBt−1 −Bt. (4)
At the end, the debt disappears, therefore (3) implies
D0 = R
−1
1 B1 + R
−1
2 B2 + · · ·+ R−1T−1BT−1 + R−1T BT . (5)
In the case of long-term household loans, the bank typically prescribes a nominally
unchanged installment B.3 Then (5) yields
D0 = [R
−1
1 + R
−1
2 + · · ·+ R−1T−1 + R−1T ]B. (6)
In the simplest case, when the interest factor is time-invariant: Rt ≡ R, i.e. Rt ≡ Rt,
then using the formula for the sum of a geometric progression, (6) is simplified:
D0 =
RT − 1
(R− 1)RT B, i.e. B =
R− 1
1−R−TD0. (7)
In fact, due to the changes in the interest rate, the repayment path can be recalcu-
lated every period, pretending that no further changes occur.
3This condition only applies to household loans, and it has historic causes. We skip its detailed
explanation.
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Theorem 1. If every period the creditor determines the annuity repayment as
if the interest rate and future repayments remained fixed, then the repayment in
period t is equal to
Bt =
Rt − 1
1−Rt−T−1t
Dt−1, t = 1, . . . , T, (8)
while the debt follows (1).
Figure 2 clearly displays that if the nominal value of the installments is constant,
then at the start, it consists mainly of interest payment, and at the end, mainly of
capital repayment, therefore the nominal value of the debt diminishes faster and
faster.
Figure 2. The repayment and debt paths with annuity. Mortgage size = 10 000
units, effective interest rate = 6%, maturity = 20 years,
To understand the nature of LC but especially of FXD loans, it is worth in-
troducing the inflation and describe the problem in real terms. We shall use the
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inflation factor pt in period t and the compounded inflation factor, the price index
Pt between periods 1 and t, Pt = ptPt−1 and P0 = 1. With their help, we shall define
the real interest factor, the real repayment and the real debt, respectively:
rt =
Rt
pt
, bt =
Bt
Pt
and dt =
Dt
Pt
. (9)
We describe dynamics (1) in real terms:
Dt
Pt
=
Rt
pt
Dt−1
Pt−1
− Bt
Pt
. (10)
With the help of (9), (10) reduces to
dt = rtdt−1 − bt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T, d0 given. (11)
Now we will examine the debt paths for various inflation rates. Let the real
interest rate be 6%, and assume perfect indexation, i.e. the nominal interest factor
is equal to the product of the real interest factor and the inflation factor. This
assumption can be interpreted as the ex post satisfaction of the well-known Fisher-
equation. Its usual simplification: nominal interest rate ≈ real interest rate +
inflation rate.
Assuming different interest rates the resulting real repayment paths are quite
different (Figure 3): for higher inflation, under perfect indexation the initial repay-
ment is higher, but its real repayment faster decreases. In the inflation-free case, we
just return to the path displayed in Figure 2.
The higher interest rate resulting from higher inflation raises the initial install-
ment to an unaffordable level. For example, calculating with an annual inflation 10%
and a 20-year maturity, the borrower should pay as much as 20% of the total loan
in the first year. The majority of the borrowers do not understand that, due to the
annuity formula, the initial repayment is mainly interest rather than capital service.
This may prevent them to take up a loan, as happened before the introduction and
the closure of the government sponsored domestic credit in Hungary, around 2004.
For relatively small loans, this may be only an illusion but for relatively high loans,
it is a real break.
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Figure 3. Real repayment paths for various inflation rates and fixed real interest
rate (r = 1.06)
3. Foreign currency denominated loans
Debt formed in foreign currency is a special form of dollarization. In most of the
cases, the debtor’s position is uncovered; her savings as well as her incomes come
from domestic currency. Contrary to a widespread opinion, the FXD loan is not a
substandard product, but it is neither riskless, therefore consumer protection mea-
sures should be taken (Heidhues, Ko˝szegi and Murooka (2012) analyze a similar case
concerning the US credit cards).
The attractiveness of the FXD in the ECE countries had been increased by the
expectation that until joining the Euro-zone, there will not be important changes ei-
ther in the foreign interest rates or in the foreign exchange rates. In other words, the
remaining period—presumed to be relatively short by many experts and debtors—
the uncovered parity will not hold.4 If the uncovered parity ex post holds, then the
depreciation rate of domestic currency exactly expresses the difference between the
domestic and foreign interest rates:
domestic interest factor = foreign interest factor × depreciation factor
or more familiarly but only approximately:
domestic interest rate ≈ foreign interest rate + depreciation rate.
4Of course, in the currency board countries (Baltic countries and Bulgaria) the depreciation
was not a risk until the CB could be preserved.
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There are two reasons why the uncovered interest parity does not hold.5 The
interest rate reflects the currency risk premium (due to the country risk, this was
not negligible for Hungary) and there is a term premium (Schepp, 2008) between the
interest rates for different maturities. In such cases, slower than uncovered interest
parity depreciation or fixed exchange rate is conceivable, and just this happened in
the foregoing countries in the period discussed. As a benchmark, in our analysis the
debt and repayment process occurring at depreciation following interest parity will
play a central role.
First we shall discuss the debt dynamics in foreign currency. Following the logic
of the previous notations (and distinguishing the foreign currency’s interest factor,
debt and repayment by *), we have
D∗t = R
∗
tD
∗
t−1 −B∗t , t = 1, 2, . . . , T. (12)
Since the banks have to make the accounts of debt and repayment in domestic
currency, and communicate with the borrowers in domestic units, we shall need the
exchange rate Et and its relative change:
et = Et/Et−1. (13)
For simplicity, it is assumed that E0 = 1, i.e. we only work with relative changes.
Therefore converting the foreign accounts into domestic ones, the repayment and
the outstanding debt are
B˜t = B
∗
tEt, and D˜t = D
∗
tEt. (14)
Theorem 1 is now replaced by
Theorem 2. If every period the creditor determines the annuity repayment of
FXD as if the foreign interest rate and future foreign currency repayments remained
fixed, then the foreign currency repayment and its domestic counterpart in period t
are respectively equal to
B∗t =
R∗t − 1
1−R∗(t−T−1)t
D∗t−1, (15)
and (14a), while the foreign and FXD debt follow (12) and (14b), respectively.
5The covered interest parity always holds, because the arbitrage pricing implies f/s = (1 +
i)/(1 + i∗) holds, where f is the forward exchange rate, s is the spot exchange rate, i and i∗ are
the domestic and foreign interest rates. The uncovered interest parity states the same for the
expected exchange rate: s∗/s = (1 + i)/(1 + i∗), but is may not hold ex post for a number of
reasons.
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(14a) attests that the FXD loans’ installments are proportional to the exchange
rate Et. If there is no depreciation, then the converted installments are also fixed,
and the path perfectly coincides with the base run.
We shall transform the formula for the foreign currency debt dynamics. Multi-
plying both sides of (12) by Et = etEt−1,
D∗tEt = R
∗
t etD
∗
t−1Et−1 −B∗tEt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
We shall need the notion of imputed domestic interest factor, equaling to the
product of the foreign currency interest factor and of the depreciation factor: R˜t =
R∗t et.
Then the FXD loan’s debt dynamics conform to that of the domestic [(1)] or of
the foreign exchange [(12)]:
D˜t = R˜tD˜t−1 − B˜t, t = 1, 2, . . . , T, (16)
only Rt and R
∗
t are replaced by R˜t in the corresponding debt equations. Though no
bank calculates with such a formula or interest factor, its use helps in the comparison
of the two types of loans.
If the actual and the imputed interest factors are equal: Rt = R˜t = R
∗
t et, then
the burden of the two loans are the same, except for the repayments are varying in
time. Since this path is quite special, we shall consider it as a benchmark path. This
is exactly the case of uncovered interest parity (domestic interest factor = foreign
interest factor × depreciation factor). If Rt > R˜t holds along the repayment period
(to be called super-parity), then the domestic loan is more costly than its FXD
counterpart; if, on the other hand, Rt < R˜t holds along the repayment period (to be
called sub-parity), then the domestic loan is less costly than its FXD counterpart.
We shall examine the mixed case later on.
We turn now to the study of nominal and real paths of repayment and debt of
a FXD mortgage in relation to a domestic mortgage with the same loan size and
maturity. We shall start with the nominal repayment path of FXD mortgages under
various depreciation rates (neglecting domestic inflation). As was already justified
in Section 2, we calculate with a domestic nominal interest rate 12%, the foreign
counterpart is 6%, the payback time remains 20 years and the loan size remains 10
K units. The uncovered interest parity corresponds now to an annual depreciation
rate 100×(1.12/1.06−1) = 5.66%. We investigate the nominal paths in Figure 4 for
four different depreciation rates: one corresponding to parity, another with faster
deprecation and the third one with a slower one and finally, with no deprecation.
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Figure 4. The repayment paths of FXD loans in LC, relative to the LC counter-
part, various depreciation rates
Figure 4 clearly shows the impact of depreciation on the borrower’s burden: the
FXD loan’s installment starts below from that of the LC counterpart, but quickly
surpasses it. For very low depreciation, the FXD installments remain below the
domestic one, but even then it rises by 50%. If the annual depreciation corresponds
to the uncovered interest parity, then the FXD installment already surpasses the
LC-based one in year 8! If the debtor took up a loan which she would have been
able to repay only for fixed exchange rate, than she would experience liquidity crisis,
due to the elevated installments. If in addition, she adjusted the loan size to the
initial domestic installments, and took up a mortgage which she would not been able
to repay in the domestic construction, then she would encounter financial difficulties
even for minor depreciation.
It is evident that if the domestic inflation rate is lower than the depreciation rate,
then the real value of the FXD repayment also increases; if the two rates are equal,
then the real value of the repayment is constant, and only if the domestic inflation
rate is higher than the depreciation rate, then the real value of the repayment
decreases. Therefore in real terms, in comparison to the monotonously decreasing
real installments, the FXD loan’s installments are only more favorable if the interest
rate is much higher than the depreciation rate. Since the FXD loans were typically
wide spread in those countries where the inflation was fast and volatile, therefore
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the nominal interest rates were high with respect to other, low-inflation countries
(like Switzerland). For low inflation (like in the Czech Republic), the interest rate
difference—generating the FXD loans—probably does not exist at all. Starting an
FXD loan, the debtor projected a similar situation, and calculated a declining real
repayment path, similar to those of the domestic loan’s. In contrast, ex post she
encountered a significant domestic depreciation and disinflation.
Until now we examined the debtors’ repayment paths. Now we turn to their
debt paths (Figure 5).
Figure 5. The nominal debt path of LC and FX denominated mortgages, various
depreciation rates.
Figure 5 attests that for slow annual depreciation, the two debt paths almost
coincide, but for significant depreciation, for a long enough initial period, the FXD
debtor experiences a higher nominal debt than at the start. We call attention to
the bulge appearing at the annual depreciation of 10%.
These results apparently suggest that the FXD debtors are worse off than the
domestic debtors, both having the same loan size: rising nominal installments, deep-
ening debt paths, and even in real terms their debt may increase for a while. If
we look behind the appearances, and compare the welfare of the two groups as
economists should do, then we must remember that the FXD debtors started with
a much lower installment. They could have consumed or saved the difference, which
meant a welfare advantage. Among the various possibilities, one of the simplest
possibilities is to compare the present values of the two repayment paths, using an
appropriate discount factor.
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For constant interest rates, the present values of the two repayment streams are
as follows:
PV =
T∑
t=1
R−tBt and P˜ V =
T∑
t=1
R−tB˜t.
For time-varying interest rates, we must return to the compounded interest fac-
tors introduced in Section 2:
PV =
T∑
t=1
R−1t Bt and P˜V =
T∑
t=1
R−1t B˜t.
Note that due to normalization E0 = 1, discounting FXD loans by the corresponding
foreign interest rates returns the original loan:
PV∗ =
T∑
t=1
R∗−1t B
∗
t = PV.
The lower the present value, the lower is the repayment burden. We are not
interested in the triviality that the loan size is equal to the present value of the
repayment, using the corresponding interest rate at discounting. Therefore if we
discounted the FXD repayment stream by the virtual discount factor R˜t, we could
obtain
P˜V∗ =
T∑
t=1
(EtRt)
−1B˜t.
Figure 6. The censored present values of LC and FX denominated mortgages,
from the start to the varying end (using the LC interest rate 12% at discounting).
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We use this tool to compare two repayment streams: one in LC, the other in
FXD. To make a meaningful comparison, we use the domestic interest rate at the
common discounting. Note that this practice overvalues the initial welfare advantage
of the FXD debtors over the domestic debtors’.
Figure 6 displays the censored present values of the two types of loans, they are
calculated for various end-points of the repayment period. Therefore the realized
burdens are comparable for any end-points. For example, the values at the end of
year 6 show the present values of the realized repayments: 6,100 units for a LC
loan of 10,000 units, with maturity 20 years. The corresponding numbers vary with
varying depreciation rates, all lower than the LC counterpart. For example, even
with the dramatic annual depreciation rate 10% only yields 5,682 units. But looking
at 18 years, the ranking is reversed, at least for this extreme case: 9,706 units vs.
13,282 units.
It is not surprising that for a constant exchange rate, the FXD debtor has the
same PV-gain over the LC debtor during the total repayment period. For slow de-
preciation, the initial PV-advantage of the FXD debtor uniformly decreases. When
the depreciation rate exactly matches the interest rate differences, the FXD debtor’s
advantage disappears at the end. Finally, if the depreciation is even faster than the
interest rate parity would require, then the initial PV-advantage sooner or later turns
into a PV-loss. We recall again that the majority of the FXD debtors had chosen
a higher loan than the LC debtors (see its analysis in Section 4 below), therefore
they were unable to make profit of their temporary advantages. Looking back from
the end of 2014, we see the FXD borrowers at their years 6–10 of their borrowing,
therefore according to our Figure 6, they still enjoy their PV-advantages over their
LC counterparts.
Until now we have assumed that the depreciation rate is time-invariant. Now we
model the impact of the exchange rate shocks which occurred in several ECE coun-
tries between 2008 and 2011. The FXD debtors, starting their repayment process
several years before the crisis, enjoyed a sub-parity depreciation or even appreciation
during the first part of their (shorter or longer) repayment periods, ending in 2008.
But since the depreciation shocks of 2008, 2010 and 2011, the majority of these
cohorts suffered from super-parity (defined above). The only exception is the cohort
of the earliest entrants, who took up their FXD loans in 2004 and 2005, and their
present values lie below the parity path.
For the sake of simplicity, in Figure 7, we only consider five cohorts, different
from each other by their dates of taking up the FXD loan: τ = 0,−1,−2,−3,−4,
i.e. we assume that the crisis started in year 0. Imitating the reality, we assume
that in year 0 the FX/LC depreciation was equal to 25% and in year 2 to another
25%, altogether 56%. Therefore the installments rose by 25% in year 0 and 56% in
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year 2 and then remained stable.6 Using our earlier methodology we determine the
present value of the realized repayments for every year of the repayment period, and
then compare them with the counterpart of the LC borrowers.
Figure 7. The relative PV advantage of the FXD debtors over the LC debtors,
depending on the start, at depreciation shocks, using the discount factor 12%.
Until now we have neglected a very important dimension of the Hungarian FXD
mortgage history, namely from the banks’ one-sided raise of the interest rate. We
have already mentioned that during the risk shock, when the banks’ cost dramati-
cally jumped, the banks raised the effective interest rates of their FXD mortgages.
If we also model this interest rate shock, assuming that the interest rate rose by
1− 1 percent point in year 0 and 1, then the picture significantly changes: only the
PV advantages of early borrowers (τ = −3 and −4) remain, the others (τ = −0,−1
or −2) lose out, their curves enter the negative domain. In other words: those, who
took up their FXD loans much before the crisis arrived, gained; all the others lost
(Figure 8). This is consistent with other expert calculations.7
6This assumption is only a stylized counterpart of the reality and neglects the further depre-
ciation but this is immaterial from our point of view.
7Cf. De Facto blog, Index.hu, February 26, 2014.
http://index.hu/gazdasag/defacto/2014/02/24/itt az igazsag a devizahitelekrol/.
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Figure 8. The relative PV advantage of the FXD debtors over the LC debtors,
depending on the start, at depreciation shocks and interest rate shock, using the
discount factor 12%.
In contrast to the depreciation, the impact of a rise of interest rate is nonlinear,
therefore we shall determine the trade-off between them. For a fixed LC interest
rate, the LC PV of a FXD mortgage is
P˜V =
T∑
t=1
R−t
(R∗ − 1)D0
1−R∗−T Et.
Inserting (15) into our last equation yields
E(R∗) =
R∗0 − 1
1−R∗−T0
1−R∗−T
R∗ − 1 ,
Fixing the domestic interest factor R0 and P˜V, we obtain the trade-off function
E(R∗).
Calculating with the base values T = 20 years and R∗ = 1.06, the following
trade-off is obtained: if the FX interest rate rises from 6 to 7%, then the neutral
depreciation level is 7.6%; if the FX interest rate rises from 6 to 8%, then the
neutral depreciation level is equal to 14.4%. In the opposite direction, a rise in the
FX interest rate from 6 to 7% was equivalent to a LC weakening of 8.2%, while a
rise in the FX interest rate from 6 to 8% was equivalent to a LC weakening of 16.8%.
As a result, the nominal LC repayment rose not only by 56% (due to depreciation)
but also by 16.8% (due to the rise in the FX interest rate).
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4. Optimal loan size
Until now we considered the size of the mortgage as given and compared the welfare
of various debtors for this given value. In this Section we make a trial to determine
the optimal loan size for a given real wage path, neglecting financial savings. Using
Samuelson (1937) additive discounted life-time utility function, (being the simplest
concave utility function), but we attribute utility not only to the annual consumption
but to the use of dwelling.
Let us denote the nominal wage by Wt, installment by Bt and the consumption
by Ct in year t. Turning to real variables,
wt =
Wt
Pt
, bt =
Bt
Pt
and ct =
Ct
Pt
. (17)
Assuming time-invariant interest rates (i.e. dropping their time index), the real
consumption (cf. (7)) is determined by
ct = wt − bt, bt = βtD0, βt = R− 1
(1−R−T )Pt , (18)
where βt is the corresponding repayment rate.
We choose the simplest lifetime utility function: we optimize the usual logarith-
mic utility function of consumption for the repayment period and the logarithmic
utility of the dwelling for an infinite period. We dropped the logarithmic utilities
of consumption for the post-repayment period, since those are independent of the
chosen loan size.8 Let κ be the relative utility of the dwelling per year. Assuming
that the dwelling is purely financed from mortgage, i.e. LTV = 100%9, the lifetime
utility function is equal to
U(c1, . . . , cT , D0) =
T∑
t=1
δt log ct + κ
∞∑
t=1
δt logD0 =
T∑
t=1
δt log ct + κ∆ logD0, (19)
where δ is the annual discount factor and
∆ =
δ
1− δ (20)
is the summarized discount factor. Then the optimal loan size can be determined.
8In more realistic models one should take into account those expenditures which depend on
the size of the dwelling.
9In our simple optimization model, the LTV does not play any important role. For example,
if the loan is only α times the dwelling value, then due to log(αD0) = logα + logD0, α is
immaterial.
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Theorem 3. The optimal domestically denominated loan size Do0 is uniquely
determined from the following implicit equation:
0 =
T∑
t=1
−δtβt
wt − βtD0 +
κ∆
D0
. (21)
Remark. Removing the denominators, we obtain a polynomial equation of
degree T +1, which has T +1 roots. Due to having a monotone right hand side, (21)
has a unique positive root but it cannot be determined explicitly except for special
cases. We shall use a numerical method for its determination.
Proof. Inserting the consumption path (18) into the utility function (19) take
the derivative of U [D0] and make it zero. This yields the first-order condition (21)
which is necessary and sufficient.
There is a case when an explicit formula determines the optimal loan size; if the
real wages are time-invariant: wt = w and there is no inflation: Pt = 1, R > 1.
Then the real repayment rate is
βt =
R− 1
1−R−T (22)
and (21) simplifies to
δ(1− δT )β
(w − βD0)(1− δ) =
κ
D0(1− δ) . (23)
After rearrangement, the optimal loan size is given as
Do0 =
κw(1−R−T )
(1− δT + κ)(R− 1) . (24)
Hence the optimal loan size
• is proportional to the real income; from a higher income one can finance pro-
portionally higher loan and larger dwelling;
• is proportional to the relative utility of the dwelling; the more important the
dwelling for us relative to other goods, we buy a larger dwelling (and take up a
larger mortgage) at the cost of reducing the consumption of other goods;
• and is approximately inversely proportional to the interest rate; the more
expensive the credit, the smaller dwelling is available and we choose a smaller mort-
gage.
In an inflationary environment, we again suppose that the indexation is perfect,
the Fisher equation is valid, i.e. the nominal interest rate changes parallel with the
inflation rate. Now the real repayment rate (βt) ceases to be time-invariant, there
is no closed formula for the optimal mortgage size. At the same time, it can be
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proved that the inflationary higher interest rate raises the real repayment rate more
than the price rise diminishes it, i.e. the optimal size is a decreasing function of the
inflation rate.
The optimal FXD mortgage size (Do0) can be determined similarly to (24); only
the real repayment rate contains the foreign currency interest rate and need be
corrected by the depreciation level (Et).
There is no simple answer whether the LC or the FXD loan-size is higher in the
optimal case. The answer depends on the parameter values of the interest rates,
the depreciation rate and the inflation rate. Of course, if there is neither inflation,
nor depreciation, but nominal interest rate = real interest rate = foreign currency
interest rate, then the two real repayment rates are the same; therefore the two
optima are also the same. For more general assumptions, only weaker answer can
be given, depending on the parameter values.
Let us assume that both the Fisher-equation (R = rp) and the uncovered interest
parity (R = R∗e) hold ex post, i.e. the domestic real interest factor = foreign
currency interest factor (r = R∗), and let us have a positive inflation rate. Our
intuition suggests that there cannot be any difference between the two optima:
what the FXD borrower gains from the lower initial repayment, he loses on the
depreciation. Translating into the real repayment rates: the LC borrower has a
declining repayment rate, while the FXD borrower has a time-invariant one, and
the two repayment paths meet sometime. At the beginning, the FXD borrower is
better-off, at the end, the LC borrower. We can give the optimal FXD loan size,
because under our two assumptions, the FXD repayment rate is time-invariant:
β˜ =
R∗ − 1
1−R∗−T ; (2˜2)
and the optimal loan size is given by
D˜o0 =
κw(1−R∗−T )
(1− δT + κ)(R∗ − 1) . (2˜4)
As was already mentioned, we shall determine the optimal LC loan size nu-
merically. Repeating our earlier statement, the ranking will depend on the chosen
parameter values. If the real LC interest rate is sufficiently low and there is infla-
tion, then the FXD optimum is greater than its LC counterpart. For high LC real
interest rate and low inflation rate, the reverse is true.
Consider the following plausible parameter value set: κ = 1/3, w = 3, 000 units
and T = 20 years10, and fix the inflation rate at the foregoing country’s National
10An annual discount factor of 0.95 is plausible for our logarithmic utility functions, w = 3, 000
units is the minimum, it could be relaxed by a rising wage-age schedule. The choice κ = 1/3
yields reasonable loan sizes.
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Bank’s target: p − 1 = 0.03, then Figure 9 shows that for rising real (FX) interest
rate at first the FXD optimum, then the LC optimum is greater than the other.
Figure 9. The optimal loan size in LC and FX denominated loans.
Illustrating ours findings by the Hungarian case: between 2004 and 2008 the
FXD borrowers encountered FX interest rates of 4–7% (on average, 6%) and inflation
rates of 4–8% (on average, 6%), while the LC interest rate was 10–13% (on average,
12%). In such an environment, our oversimplified model gave a slightly higher (3–
5%) optimal loan size for the FXD than the LC mortgage.
5. Conclusions
The present study applied very simple models for discovering several properties
of the FXD loans. Our first result shows those inflationary and exchange rate
paths for which the financial burden of the domestic and FXD loans are the same.
To do so we introduced the mixed present value of the FXD loans discounted by
the domestic interest rate. We demonstrated the benchmark role of the exchange
rate path satisfying the uncovered interest parity, where the two types of debtors
have the same burden. Analyzing actual exchange rate paths, we showed that
the relative situation of the FXD debtors would have been much better than the
domestic debtors without the one-sided interest rate rises. Further research may
compare internationally the two types debtors’ financial situation.
We were able to obtain a simple formula for the trade-off between a one-time
depreciation and a permanent interest rate rise. Under the circumstances of the
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Hungarian FXD loans, 1 percent point rise in the FX interest rate is equivalent to a
once-and-for-all depreciation of 8-9%. This provides an answer to the deterioration
of the FXD debtors: their drop in welfare arises from the simultaneous shock of
exchange rate and interest rate. This may serve as a starting point for further
research in the issue of nonperforming loans.
Introducing the real values of the repayments is especially important because
of their use in the consumption model. In this framework, we have constructed a
very simple model for calculating the optimal loan size. It only yields very primi-
tive results; for example, the numerical conditions when the FXD mortgage results
in a larger loan-size than the domestic one. Using calibrated data, the former is
greater than the latter. The comparison of our results with the actual behavior
was beyond the scope of our research but developing the model it could be used
to examine further fields discussed in the literature, namely excessive indebtedness,
non performance etc.
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